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Jones: Merger Doctrine No Defense to Deceptive Trade Practices Suit for

CASENOTES

CONSUMER PROTECTION-Breach of Warranty-Merger
Doctrine No Defense To Deceptive Trade Practices Suit
For Breach Of Express Warranty. Alvarado v. Bolton,
749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
In 1973, David R. Bolton and other investors purchased a fifty acre parcel
of land.' In connection with the purchase, Bolton acquired ownership of
one-half of the property's mineral rights.2 Bolton subdivided 29.2 acres of
the property into twenty-six lots and thereafter sold the lots to individual
purchasers, one of whom was Eusebio Alvarado.3 Alvarado's earnest money
contract provided that Bolton would convey his lot by general warranty
deed free and clear from all unlisted encumbrances.4 Alvarado's contract,
however, omitted any reference to a reservation of Bolton's one-half mineral
ownership.5 At closing, Bolton delivered and Alvarado accepted the deed
which reserved Bolton's mineral interests.6
Subsequent to Alvarado and Bolton closing the transaction, oil was dis1. Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 47 (Tex. 1988). Bolton was the general partner of
a limited partnership participating in the land acquisition. Id.
2. Id. The original grantor of the land reserved the balance of the mineral rights within
the deed to the fifty acre parcel. See Bolton v. Alvarado, 714 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex. App.Houston (1st Dist.] 1986), rev'd, 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988). In addition to owning the land
and mineral rights, Bolton acted as trustee for the venture that subdivided and sold the lots.
See Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 47.
3. Id. Each prospective purchaser signed an earnest money contract with Bolton evidencing their agreement of sale. Id.
4. Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 47 (Tex. 1988). The pertinent portion of the provision governing Bolton's delivery of the general warranty deed stated "seller agrees to execute
and deliver General Warranty Deed to purchaser conveying said property free and clear of all
encumbrances except those named herein." Bolton, 714 S.W.2d at 120.
5. Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 47. Some of Bolton's purchasers received earnest money contracts which contained provisions reserving Bolton's mineral interest. Id. Alvarado's contract, however, had omitted any reservation of Bolton's mineral ownership. Id.
6. Id. at 47-48. All of the deeds delivered by Bolton contained a reservation of his mineral ownership. Id. at 47. In spite of Bolton's specific reservation of his mineral rights in the
deed, the owner's title policy issued by Gulfland Title Company to Alvarado failed to include
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covered under the fifty acre parcel.7 The oil discovery precipitated Alvarado's suit against Bolton for reformation of the deed and damages under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act due to a breach of express warranty.' The
trial court reformed Alvarado's deed to include a one-half mineral ownership, and awarded him treble damages and attorney's fees. 9 The court of
appeals reversed and rendered a take nothing judgment because the jury
failed to find the existence of fraud or mutual mistake necessary to avoid the

doctrine of merger."0 The Texas Supreme Court granted Alvarado's appeal
to decide whether a suit under the DTPA bars use of the merger doctrine to
extinguish an express warranty within the earnest money contract upon delivery of the deed." Held - Reversed. In a suit for damages under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the merger doctrine is no defense to a suit
for breach of express warranty.' 2
In 1973, the Texas legislature enacted the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(the "DTPA") to protect consumers from deceptive trade practices in the
sale or lease of goods or services.1 3 The DTPA protects consumers by rean exception for Bolton's mineral reservation as outlined in the deed. See Bolton v. Alvarado,
714 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986), rev'd, 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
7. See Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 48.
8. See id. The court did not mention that a property owner, apparently not Alvarado,
originally contacted Gulfland Title Company after the oil discovery. See Bolton, 714 S.W.2d
at 121. After being contacted, Gulfland reviewed all of the owner's title policies and discovered they had failed to disclose Bolton's reservation of the mineral rights. Id. Gulfland informed the respective owners that they must either participate in a suit against Bolton over the
mineral rights or waive any recourse they may have under their respective owner's title policies. Id.
9. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 47 (Tex. 1988). The treble damage award was
calculated using the oil's production value. See id. Furthermore, the trial court disregarded
the jury's failure to award attorney's fees and awarded Alvarado $20,000. See Bolton, 714
S.W.2d at 122.
10. See Bolton, 714 S.W.2d at 123. By trial amendment, Alvarado pleaded fraud and
mutual mistake. Id. The special issues submitted to the jury were arranged in such a manner
that if they found Bolton intended to sell the mineral rights, they would not answer the special
issues concerning fraud or mutual mistake. See id.By finding that Bolton intended to sell the
mineral rights, the jury found that there was no fraud or mistake on Bolton's part. Id. The
court of appeals decided that, unless fraud or mutual mistake was present, the merger doctrine
applied. See id. Furthermore, the jury failed to find fraud or mutual mistake when they found
that Bolton intended to sell and not retain the mineral rights under the earnest money contract. Id.
11. See Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 47.
12. Id. at 48.
13. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987). The express purpose
of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") is "to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty."
Id. § 17.44; see Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)(DTPA's purpose to protect
consumer with cause of action for deceptive trade practices); see also Woods v. Littleton, 554
S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977)(DTPA provides effective remedy for injured consumers in order
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dressing injuries through causes of action which are unrestrained by the
proof requirements of the traditional common-law defenses encountered in

breach of warranty and fraud actions.1 4 The DTPA also encourages the

consumer to pursue DTPA suits by providing incentives in the form of
awards of additional damages,' 5 court costs,' 6 and attorney's fees. 1 7 The
prospect of additional damages, court costs, and attorney's fees, without the
arduous proof requirements of traditional common-law actions, purports to
stimulate pursuit of claims under the DTPA and be an effective restraint to

individuals employing deceptive business practices."8

to encourage lawsuits). See generally Curry, The 1979 Amendments to the Deceptive Trade
Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 51 (1980)(d'scussing legislative
intent in promulgating DTPA); Krahmer, Lovell & McCormick, Banks and the Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 2 (1987)(outlining design of DTPA as
consumer protection tool).
14. See, e.g., Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985)(traditional contractual
principles such as parol evidence rule which bar admission of oral misrepresentations do not
apply to DTPA suits); Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616 (DTPA claim not burdened by commonlaw proof requirements and defenses); Joseph v. PPG Indus., Inc., 674 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(common-law defenses such as failure of consideration
cannot be employed to defeat DTPA claim). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J.
LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 244 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing inability of commonlaw defenses to defeat DTPA claims); Watson, Defending Deceptive Trade Practices Claims, 18
TEX. TECH L. REV. 77, 92 (1987)(discussing exclusion of common-law defenses in DTPA
actions).
15. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987). The DTPA provides
for additional damages in excess of actual damages for the prevailing consumer. See id.; see
also, e.g., Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. 1980)(DTPA provision for
treble damages encourages consumer litigation); Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 670
(Tex. 1977)(DTPA treble damages provision provides incentive for individuals to seek redress
under DTPA). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER
LITIGATION 201-05 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing history of treble damages provision in DTPA);
Comment, UCC Warranty Disclaimers and the No Waiver Provision of the Deceptive Trade
Practicesand Consumer ProtectionAct. Can the Conflict be Resolved?, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV.
211, 214-15 (1987)(discussing DTPA incentives for consumer suits).
16. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987)(recovery of court costs
allowed for prevailing party); see also Doerfler v Espensen Co., 659 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ)(DTPA allows prevailing party to recover court costs). See
generally McCarthy, An Analysis of the 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct and Possible
Ramifications ofRecent Amendments: Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented?, 1IST. MARY'S L.J.
885, 904 (1980)(discussing award of court costs under DTPA).
17. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987)(DTPA allows prevailing
party to recover attorney's fees); see also McKinley v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. 1985)(successful party allowed to recover attorney's fees even though no net recovery occurs). But see
Cravens v. Skinner, 626 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ)(award of
attorney's fee requires judgment for actual damages). See generally Curry, The 1979 Amendments to the Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 51. 64
(1980)(discussing award of attorney's fees).
18. See Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. 1985)(DTPA designed to pro-
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The DTPA makes actionable the use of unfair business tactics which victimize consumers' 9 who are seeking 20 goods2' or services22 for use. 23 To
mote underlying purpose of preventing deceptive business practices and unconscionable acts);
see also Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)(DTPA provides cause of action
without common-law proof requirement or defenses); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d
682, 690 (Tex. 1980)(purpose of excess actual damages to deter DTPA violations); Woods v.
Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. 1977)(DTPA provides consumers with ability to deter
dishonest practices). See generally Curry, The 1979 Amendments to the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer ProtectionAct, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 51-53 (1980)(discussing overview of
DTPA's effect on consumer litigation); Comment, UCC Warranty Disclaimers and the "No
Waiver" Provision of the Deceptive Trade Practicesand Consumer ProtectionAct: Can the Conflict Be Resolved?, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 211, 214-15 (1987)(discussing DTPA's purpose of
promotion of consumer litigation).
19. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987). The DTPA defines consumer as "an individual ...who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services."
Id.; see also Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex. 1987)(plaintiffs
must seek goods or services to gain consumer status); Chastain, 700 S.W.2d at 581 (plaintiff
must be consumer to recover under DTPA); Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co., 661
S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1983)(standing under DTPA predicated on party obtaining consumer
status); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)(plaintiff must
seek goods or services for consumer qualification); Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d
169, 174 (Tex. 1980)(consumer must seek or acquire services to bring DTPA suit). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 18-19 (2d ed.
1983)(discussing consumer standing); Watson, Defending Deceptive Trade PracticesClaims, 18
TEX. TECH L. REV. 77, 93-95 (1987)(discussing requirement for obtaining consumer status
under DTPA).
20. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987)(consumer status results
from seeking goods or services); see also Dickson Distrib. Co. v. Le June, 662 S.W.2d 693, 695
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ)(consumer status obtained even though transaction never consummated); Anderson v. Havins, 595 S.W.2d 147, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1980, no writ)(DTPA applies to real estate transaction whether or not purchase
completed). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 19-20 (2d ed. 1983)(analysis of requirement for seeking goods or services).
21. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987)(goods consist of tangible
chattels and real property); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. 1980)(definition of goods includes those to be manufactured in future); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.105(a) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968)(definition of goods). Goods are defined as "all things
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in
which the price is to be paid, investment securities and things in action." Id.; see also TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(8) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon Supp. 1988)(definition of goods).
Goods are defined to "include all things which are movable at the time the security interest
attaches or which are fixtures, but does not include money, documents, instruments, accounts,
chattel paper, general intangibles, or minerals or the like (including oil and gas) before extraction." Id. See generally Watson, Defending Deceptive Trade Practices Claims, 18 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 77, 95 (1987)(discussing definition ol goods).
22. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon 1987)(services consist of work,
labor and services purchased); see also Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174
(Tex. 1980)(quoting Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1962)(defining
services)). In Riverside National Bank, the court defines services as an "action or use that
furthers some end or purpose: conduct or performance that assists or benefits someone or
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attain consumer status under the DTPA, the plaintiff's complaint must allege the existence of a deceptive trade transaction in which he sought or
acquired goods or services.2 4 Because of the DTPA's coverage, individuals
selling goods or services to consumers are subject to liability if they under25
take a course of conduct which violates the DTPA's "laundry list,"
breaches any warranty, 26 is unconscionable, 27 or violates Texas Insurance

something: deeds useful or instrumental towards some object." Id. See generally D. BRAGG,
P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 24-27 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing
requirements for qualification as services under DTPA).
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987)(goods must be leased or
purchased for use); see also Big H Auto Auction, Inc. v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 75859 (Tex. 1984)(purchases made for resale qualify as "for use"); Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage
and Sales, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1980, writ
dism'd)(defining "for use"). The court in Otto stated that the purchase of cotton for resale was
contemplated within the definition of "for use." Id. See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL &
J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 27-33 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing concept of "for
use").
24. See, e.g., Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. 1985)(consumer must base
complaint on transaction involving goods or services actually sought or acquired); Cameron v.
Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)(goods or services whether purchased
or leased must be basis of complaint).
25. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987)(DTPA cause of action for
deceptive acts). Section 17.46(a) declares "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce" to be unlawful. Id. Section 17.46(b) contains a nonexclusive list of 24 activities under which an individual will be held liable under the DTPA.
Id.; see also Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex. 1978). In Spradling, the
Texas Supreme Court approved that portion of the trial court's jury instruction which stated
"the term false, misleading or deceptive acts or practices means an act or series of acts which
has the capacity or tendency to deceive an average or ordinary person, even though that person
may have been ignorant, unthinking or credulous." Id.; see also Nagy v. First Nat'l Gun
Banque Corp., 684 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Nagy, the
court of appeals determined that a deceptive statement is one which tends to deceive "the
ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous" who rely upon the general appearances and impressions of the statement. Id. See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS
CONSUMER LITIGATION

73-77 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing application of section 17.46(a)-(b));

Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 625-34 (1977)(discussing DTPA laundry list
violations).
26. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987)(DTPA cause of action
for breach of warranty). The DTPA provides consumers with a cause of action for "breach of
an express or implied warranty." Id.; see also Ralston Oil and Gas Co. v. Gensco, Inc., 706
F.2d 685, 692 (5th Cir. 1983)(non-compliance with express or implied warranties provides
consumers with cause of action); Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ)(adversely affected consumer has cause of action for breach
of express or implied warranties). See generally Maxwell, Public and PrivateRights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617,
658-61 (1977)(breach of warranty actionable under DTPA).
27. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon 1987)(DTPA cause of action
for unconscionable acts). The DTPA provides consumers a cause of action against "any un-
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Code article 21.21.28
Texas courts have consistently held that an individual accused of using
deceptive business tactics cannot rely upon common-law doctrines to defend
the DTPA suit. 29 In maintaining this position, the courts have relied upon

the basic premises that the DTPA is not a codification of common-law defenses30 and that the DTPA mandates liberal construction of its provisions. 3 Texas courts confronted with common-law defenses in DTPA suits
conscionable action or course of action by any person." Id. The DTPA defines "an uncon-

scionable action or course of action" to mean "an act or practice which, to a person's
detriment takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of a person
to a grossly unfair degree; or results in gross disparity between the value received and consider-

ation paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration." Id. § 17.45(5)(A)-(B); see also
Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. 1985)(taking unfair advantage of consumer
insufficient to establish unconscionable act unless advantage grossly unfair); Bel-Go Assocs.Mula Road v. Vitale, 723 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no

writ)(DTPA suit for unconscionable acts). In Bel-Go, the court of appeals found that the 80
year-old seller of the land did not take advantage of the plaintiff in light of plaintiff's experience as a real estate developer. Id. See generally Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and
Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J.
617, 661-64 (1977)(discussing unconscionable acts under DTPA).
28. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 1987)(violation of Texas Insurance Code actionable under DTPA). The DTPA provides consumers with a cause of action
for "the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of Article 21.21,
Texas Insurance Code, as amended, or rules or regulations issued by the State Board of Insurance under Article 21.21, Texas Insurance Code, as amended." Id.; see also McNeil v. McDavid Ins. Agency, 594 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ)(failure to
explain insurance application form and coverage not deceptive practice or act). See generally
Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 664-70 (1977)(discussing cause of action under
article 21.21 of Texas Insurance Code).
29. See Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 599-600 (Tex. 1985)(parol evidence rule no
defense to oral representations actionable under DTPA); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 611
S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)(section 17.46 suit cannot be defended with common-law defenses); Joseph v. PPG Indus., Inc., 674 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(common-law defenses unavailable to defeat DTPA claims). In Joseph, the court apparently deemed that Smith v. Baldwin stood for the proposition that common-law defenses were
absolutely barred from use in DTPA suits. Id. However, a logical argument can be made that
Smith v. Baldwin stands solely for the proposition that common-law defenses are only barred
from use in section 17.46 suits. See Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616. Therefore, common-law
defenses are available to defend DTPA suits under section 17.50. See id. See generally Watson, Defending Deceptive Trade Practices Claims, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 77, 92-93 (1987)(discussing common-law defenses inapplicable to DTPA suit).
30. See, e.g., Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616 (DTPA does not codify common law); Joseph,
674 S.W.2d at 865 (DTPA not designed to codify common law).
31. TEX. Bus. & CoM COI)1 ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987)(legislature intended liberal
construction of DTPA); see Melody Home Mfg. Co, v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex.
1987)(DTPA should be construed liberally for promotion of underlying purpose of consumer
protection); see also Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. 1985)(DTPA's underlying
purpose of consumer protection promoted by liberal construction); Woods v. Littleton, 554
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have held that defenses such as the parol evidence rule, substantial perform32
ance, and the merger doctrine are unavailable to defeat the DTPA claim.
Under the DTPA, a consumer injured by a breach of warranty can bring
suit against the breaching party without confronting common-law defenses
which would bar the suit. 33 However, because the DTPA does not contain
specific warranties, DTPA suits seeking damages for a breach of warranty
must allege the existence of an independently created warranty. 34 These independent warranties are generally created under statutes enacted by the
legislature, 3 - and from implied 36 or express warranties provided by contract

S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1977)(DTPA mandates liberal construction of its provisions); Krahmer,
Lovell & McCormick, Banks and the Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct, 18 TEX. TECH L.

REV. 1, 2 (1987)(DTPA mandates liberal construction to facilitate underlying purpose of consumer protection).
32. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988)(common-law doctrine of
merger unavailable in DTPA breach of warranty suit); Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 (parol evidence admissible in DTPA suit in spite of common-law prohibitions); Smith v. Baldwin, 611
S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. 1980)(common-law defense of substantial performance rejected in section 17.46 suit). See generally Watson, Defending Deceptive Trade Practices Claims, 18 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 77, 92 (1987)(discussing inapplicability of common-law defenses).

33. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987)(providing DTPA cause
of action for breach of warranty); see, e.g., Ralston Oil and Gas Co. v. Gensco, Inc., 706 F.2d
685, 692 (5th Cir. 1983)(DTPA provides cause of action for failure to comply with warranties); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987)(DTPA suit available
for breach of implied warranty); La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673
S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. 1984)(injuries from breach of express or implied warranties actionable
under DTPA). See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER

LITIGATION 133-50 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing DTPA warranty actions); Comment, UCC Warranty Disclaimers and the "No Waiver" Provision of the Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act: Can the Conflict Be Resolved?, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 211, 231-35
(1987)(discussing warranties and waivers of warranties in relation to DTPA).
34. See, e.g., La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at 565 (DTPA does not contain warranties
which give rise to DTPA cause of action); Miller v. Spencer, 732 S.W.2d 758, 759-60 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, no writ)(warranty must be created independent of DTPA by statute, contract, or common law); Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(enforcement of warranties requires creation independent of
DTPA provisions); Bunting v. Fodor. 586 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1979, no writ)(because no warranties contained in DTPA, consumer must establish implied warranty's existence before enforcement will result under DTPA); D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 133-35 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing
allowable sources of warranties enforceable under DTPA).
35. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.313, 2.314, 2.315 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon
1968)(Uniform Commercial Code warranties); see also La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at 565 (Uniform Commercial Code przvides source of implied warranties); Bormaster v. Henderson, 624
S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ)(express warranties found
within Texas Business and Commerce Code). See generally Comment, UCC Warranty Disclaimersand the "No Waiver" Provision of the Deceptive Trade Practicesand Consumer Protection Act: Can the Conflict Be Resolved?, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 211, 231-35 (1987)(discussing
Uniform Commercial Code warranties).
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or the common law." However, prior to enforcement of any warranty, the
courts look to both the source of the warranty's creation as well as the parties' subsequent agreement to limit, modify, or exclude the warranty.3 8
Texas courts have generally followed the common-law merger doctrine to

determine the parties' rights in land conveyances which, by its design, includes a determination of the existence of any warranties.3 9 The doctrine, in
36. See, e.g., Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1987)(public
policy mandates that warranties arise through operation of law); La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at
565 (implied warranties created based primarily on tort rather than contract through operation
of law); Donelson v. Fairmont Foods Co., 252 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1952,
writ ref'd n.r.e.Xdiscussing common-law implied warranties). In Donelson, the court of civil
appeals identified an implied warranty as a seller's representation or promise involving the
property's quality or suitability which the law provides for incorporation into the terms of the
contract and requires compliance therewith. Id. See generally Krahmer, Lovell & McCormick, Banks and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3 n.21
(1987)(outlining several common-law implied warranties).
37. See La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at 565 (agreement of parties imposes express warranties within contract); see also McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755,
757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(defining express warranty). In
McCrea, the court of appeals stated a seller creates an express warranty when he "makes an
affirmation of fact or a promise to the purchaser, which relates to the sale and warrants a
conformity to the affirmation as promised." Id. See generally D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J.
LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 133, 134 (2d ed. 1983)(discussing express warranties); S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 970 (3d ed. 1964)(defining
conditions required to impose express warranty).
38. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968)(providing for
exclusion or modification of warranties). Section 2.316 allows the seller, under certain conditions, to exclude or modify a previously made express warranty as well as the implied warranty
of merchantability and warranty of fitness for a particular use in the sale of goods. Id.; see also
Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1252 (5th Cir.)(disclaimer of implied
warranty of merchantability allowed where disclaimer is conspicuous and mentions
merchantability), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1980); Singleton v. LaCoure, 712 S.W.2d 757, 760
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(DTPA breach of warranty action
inappropriate where implied warranty properly disclaimed under section 2.316); McCrea v.
Cubilla Condominium Corp., N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(contract which specifically excludes express or implied warranties constitutes waiver of DTPA breach of warranty suit unless against public policy or statute); Rinehart v. Sonitrol of Dallas, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(provisions limiting contracted liability are effective in DTPA breach of warranty suits).
See generally Weintraub, Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Damages for Breach of
Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TEX, L. REv. 60, 65-70 (1974)(discussing exclusion and modification of express and implied warranties under Uniform Commercial Code).
39. See Union Producing Co. v. Sanborn, 194 F. Supp. 121, 126 (E.D. Tex. 1961)(outlining requirements of merger doctrine). In Sanborn, the court stated that Texas follows the well
settled principle that all oral or written agreements of the parties are presumed to merge into
the deed unless the plaintiff alleges and proves mistake, accident, or fraud. Id. Upon a deed's
delivery and acceptance as performance of an earnest money contract, the deed is deemed to be
"the final expression of the agreement of the parties and the sole repository of the terms on
which they have agreed." Id.; see also Baker v. Baker, 207 S.W.2d 244, 249-50 (Tex. Civ.
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its most basic form, provides that all prior negotiations, as well as oral or
written agreements, are presumed merged into the deed upon its delivery

and acceptance.'

°

The deed is thereafter deemed to be conclusive as to the

rights, duties, and obligations of its parties, and must be looked to exclusively for a determination of their rights.4 Exceptions to the doctrine exist
which allow the admission of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties'
rights where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant committed fraud, accident, or mistake in the conveyance, 42 or where the plaintiff alleges the exist-

App.-San Antonio 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(contract merges into deed upon delivery and acceptance). In Baker, the court outlined the merger doctrine which provides for merger of the
contract into the deed upon delivery and acceptance. Id. at 249. After merger, the deed alone
determines the parties' rights. Id.; see also Wells v. Burroughs, 65 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1933, no writ)(contract merges into deed which expresses parties' agreements). The merger doctrine prevents a party from raising a claim that the title which was
passed from the seller to the purchaser is different than the title recited in the deed. See
Goldman & Berghel, Common Law Doctrine of Merger: The Exceptions Are the Rule, 13 U.
BALT. L. REV. 19, 20 (1983)(discussing merger doctrine). The doctrine's purpose is to maximize "security or safety in [deeds] or in titles held under them." Id. In other words, the
doctrine is designed to prevent swearing matches between the parties to a deed after delivery
and acceptance. Id. See generally R. DEVLIN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS
1570-71 (3d ed. 191 1)(discussing principle of merger of contract and deed); S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 926 (3d ed. 1964)(discussing requirements of

merger doctrine).
40. See, e.g., Union Producing Co., 194 F. Supp. at 126 (all prior agreements presumed
merged into deed); Baker, 207 S.W.2d at 249 (contract merges into deed upon delivery and

acceptance); Wells, 65 S.W.2d at 397 (all prior contracts presumed merged into deed). But see
Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Tex. 1979)(merger does not occur where deed represents partial performance of contract). A deed which only partially performs the contract does
not contain those provisions which are deemed collateral. Id. For example, a contract which

contains a provision requiring completion of construction is not totally merged into the deed.
Id. The completion provision will survive merger if construction is incomplete at the time of
the deed's delivery and acceptance. Id.; see also Catalfimo, Merger of Land Contract in Deed,
25 ALB. L. REV. 122, 123 (1961)(discussing collateral covenants). A contract provision which
the merger doctrine does not merge into the deed is referred to as a collateral covenant or
agreement. See id.; Goldman & Berghel, Common Law Doctrine of Merger: The Exceptions
Are the Rule, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 19, 21 (1983)(discussing collateral agreements). Collateral
agreements, in order to survive the doctrine's application, must involve some aspect of the
transaction other than the terms of the purchase or sale of the land. Id. Those provisions of
the contract which are conclusively presumed to be merged into the deed typically involve
"title, possession, quantity, or emblements, even though the contract and deed vary." Id. at 21

& n.10. See generally R.

DEVLIN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS

1570-71 (3d

ed. 191 i)(discussing merger of contract and deed).
41. See, e.g., Union Producing, 194 F. Supp. at 126 (deed is final expression of parties'
agreement); Baker, 207 S.W.2d at 249 (deed alone determines parties' rights); Wells, 65

S.W.2d at 397 (deed expresses all of parties' agreements); S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926 (3d ed. 1964)(deed is sole repository of parties' agreement).

THE

42. See Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985)(merger occurs
unless fraud, accident or mistake present); see also Grohn v. Marquardt, 657 S.W.2d 851, 855
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ence of an ambiguity within the deed.4 3 Extrinsic evidence which would
tend to contradict the language of the deed, however, is inadmissible in the
absence of an exception to the merger doctrine." Therefore, the doctrine
presents an obstacle to extrinsic evidence which would vary the deed's
terms.4" Based upon the doctrine's operation and absent any exception, a
properly delivered and accepted deed generally binds the parties to the terms
and conditions which it contains.46
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(defining fraud). In Grohn, the court stated
that in order to prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant falsely represented a
material fact, he believed the representation was true, and he relied on the representation. Id.;
see also Turberville v. Upper Valley Farms, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1981, no writ)(discussing mutual mistake). In Turberville, the court stated that
in order to establish a mutual mistake, all parties to the transaction must believe that a material fact existed which in fact did not exist or become part of the transaction. Id.; see also
Wells v. Burroughs, 65 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1933, no writ). In Wells,
the evidence did not show that the contract provision was omitted from the deed through
mistake, accident or fraud which was required to prohibit application of the doctrine. Id. See
generally Goldman & Berghel, Common Law Doctrine of Merger: The Exceptions Are the
Rule, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 19, 26 (1983)(discussing exceptions to merger). The Maryland
Consumer Protection Act also impliedly provides exceptions to the doctrine of merger in consumer real estate sales such as home purchases. See id. at 26-30.
43. See Davis v. Davis, 175 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex. 1943)(extrinsic evidence admissible
where fraud, accident or mistake alleged); see also Murphy v. Dilworth, 151 S.W.2d 1004,
1005 (Tex. 1941)(parol evidence admissible where deed ambiguous); Grohn v. Marquardt, 657
S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(fraud allegation provides
exception to parol evidence rule); Anderson v. Havins, 595 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1980, writ dism'd)(pleading fraud allows introduction of parol evidence).
44. See Perry, 756 F.2d at 1205 (proof of fraud required to avoid merger doctrine). In
Perry, the jury failed to find the existence of fraud, and therefore the merger doctrine was
applied to the contract and deed. Id.; see also Davis, 175 S.W.2d at 229 (allegation of fraud
required to admit extrinsic evidence to vary deed's legal effect); Murphy, 151 S.W.2d at 100506 (discussing ambiguity). Ambiguity is typically alleged when the parties' intent underlying a
specific provision of the deed is indeterminable. See id. If intent is ambiguous, then parol
evidence is admissible to explain, but not contradict, the deed. Id.; Peterson v. Barron, 401
S.W.2d 680, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, no writ)(unambiguous deed prevents admission of extrinsic evidence to vary terms of deed). See generally R. DEVLIN, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS 1572 (3d ed. 1911)(discussing requirement of fraud and mistake
to avoid conclusive effect of deed); R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL

§ 1641(a) (1980)(discussing parol evidence rule as applied to deeds).
45. See, e.g., Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982)(unambiguous deed prevents looking beyond four corners of deed); Davis, 175 S.W.2d at 229 (absence of ambiguity
prevents admission of extrinsic evidence to explain deed); Murphy, 151 S.W.2d at 1005-06
(ambiguity allows admission of extrinsic evidence to explain deed's terms); see also Peterson,
401 S.W.2d at 685 (parties cannot vary terms of contract with extrinsic evidence). See generally R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 1641(a) (1980)(discussing

prohibition of admission of extrinsic evidence where deed unambiguous).
46. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982)(discussing deed's binding effect on parties). In Westland Oil, the court stated that purchasers are
bound by the deed's contents including recitals, references, and reservations. Id.; see also
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In Alvarado v. Bolton,4 7 the Texas Supreme Court held that a DTPA suit
premised upon a breach of express warranty contained in an earnest money
contract could not be defeated by applying the merger doctrine.48 Justice
Ray, writing for the majority, outlined four reasons to bar the doctrine's
use.4 9 First, the merger doctrine prohibits introduction of any warranties
created in the earnest money contract which contradict the language contained within the deed.5° Second, the parol evidence rule excludes admission
of evidence of any warranties. 5 Third, the DTPA does not codify the requirements of the common law.5 2 Fourth, the jury found that under the
earnest money contract, Bolton intended and included an express warranty
53
to deliver the mineral rights that was breached by delivery of the deed.
Even though the court recognized that delivery and acceptance of the
deed typically results in merger of the deed and contract, the court held that
the doctrine was not applicable to a breach of warranty suit under the
DTPA.5 4 The court restated its decisions in Smith v. Baldwin55 and Weitzel

Greene v. White, 153 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Tex. 1941)(purchaser's acceptance of deed binds him
to recitals and reservations therein); Bradford v. Thompson, 460 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1970)(accepted deed binds purchaser to all recitals it contains), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 470 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); R. DEVLIN, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS 1572 (3d ed. 191 1)(deed is conclusive of parties'
agreement).
47. 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
48. See id. at 48. Bolton apparently attempted to establish that the warranty had been
extinguished by the merger of the deed and contract under the doctrine of merger. Id. The
court decided that the doctrine of merger was a common-law defense and, therefore, unavailable to defeat a DTPA claim. Id.
49. See id. The court utilized a syllogism premised upon the jury's finding, the requirements of the doctrine, and the DTPA's purpose to support its holding that a DTPA claim
cannot be defeated by the doctrine of merger. Id.
50. See id. The court recognized that the merger doctrine would extinguish any contract
warranties if applied to the facts and circumstances of Alvarado. Id.
51. See id. The court recognized that the parol evidence rule would prevent admission of
the earnest money contract into evidence to establish the alleged warranty. Id.
52. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988). The court restated its position that the DTPA was not a common-law codification, but was a consumer protection statute without the proof and defense burdens of the common law. Id.
53. See id. The court outlined that the jury had found an express warranty as required to
maintain a breach of warranty claim under the DTPA. Id.
54. See id. The court outlined the requirement of the merger doctrine as stated in Baker
v. Baker, 207 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See Alvarado,
749 S.W.2d at 48. The merger doctrine provides for consolidation of the contract and deed
upon delivery and acceptance of the deed as performance of the contract. Id.
55. 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980). DTPA causes of action do not have the rigorous
proof requirements and are not subject to the numerous defenses of common-law actions. Id.
In Baldwin, the court decided that the defense of substantial performance of a construction
contract could not bar a section 17.46 DTPA claim when the builder's representations remained unfulfilled. See id. at 614.
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v. Barnes5 6 which restricted the application of common-law doctrines in
DTPA cases."

As a result, the court continued its policy of barring the use

of common-law doctrines to defeat DTPA suits.58
In his dissent, Justice Wallace, joined by Chief Justice Phillips and Justices Gonzalez and Culver, argued that Bolton did not commit a breach of
express warranty as a matter of law.5 9 Justice Wallace applied the merger
doctrine and contended that any warranty created by the earnest money
contract was extinguished upon Alvarado's acceptance of the deed.'

Justice

Wallace concluded that the majority erred in stating that the deed, which
did not comply with the requirements of the earnest money contract,
breached the express warranty created therein because at the time the purported breach occurred, the contract and deed had merged and extinguished
the warranty.6 '
Justice Wallace conceded that if Alvarado had alleged Bolton misrepresented some aspect of the transaction, the doctrine would not bar parol evi-

dence from establishing the misrepresentation. 62 He contended, however,
that the court's prior holding in Weitzel 63 which allowed admission of parol
evidence for a "laundry list" violation did not allow establishment of an ex64

press warranty by parol evidence where a fully integrated deed existed.
Justice Wallace concluded that Alvarado's suit was brought under the

56. 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985). The parol evidence rule does not bar admission of
oral representations to support a consumer's claim in a DTPA suit. Id.
57. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988)(merger doctrine does not bar
enforcement of express warranties in earnest money contract under DTPA); see also Weitzel,
691 S.W.2d at 600 (parol evidence rule does not bar admission of oral representations in
DTPA suit); Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616 (common-law defenses unavailable in section 17.46
suit).
58. See Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 48. The court held that the merger doctrine was not
applicable to a DTPA suit involving the breach of an express warranty. Id.
59. See Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 48 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Justice Wallace contended
that as a rule of law, the doctrine of merger stated in Baker v. Baker extinguished any warranty. See id. Merger of the contract into the deed extinguished any warranty contained in
the earnest money contract. Id. at 48-49 (Wallace, J., dissenting). His dissent stated that the
doctrine merges the terms of the contract into the deed, and the deed then determines the
parties' rights. Id.
60. See id. at 49. Justice Wallace stated that Alvarado's acceptance of the deed extinguished any warranty which the contract contained. Id.
61. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. 1988)(Wallace, J., dissenting) (discussing absence of warranty). Justice Wallace determined that the simultaneous acts of acceptance and merger of the contract into the deed precluded the breach of any warranty
because no warranty existed. Id. at 49-50.
62. See id. Because oral representations cannot be barred by the parol evidence rule in a
DTPA suit, Justice Wallace agreed that any representations made outside the deed were admissible to establish a DTPA cause of action. Id.
63. 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
64. See Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 49 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Justice Wallace interpreted
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DTPA in an attempt to create a warranty for recovery purposes which could
not be found within the language of the deed.6 5

In Alvarado v. Bolton, the Texas Supreme Court expanded the DTPA's
coverage by precluding use of the merger doctrine as a defense to a breach of

express warranty action. 66 The court in Alvarado relied on the Baldwin and
Weitzel decisions wherein the court held that the DTPA does not codify
common-law principles 67 and that common-law defenses are unavailable in a
DTPA suit. 68 As a consequence of the Alvarado decision, a seller of land
may no longer rely upon the accepted deed to conclusively establish his
rights, duties, and obligations to the purchaser. 69 Thus, titles in land conveyances are now affected by the DTPA, subjecting the seller to sanctions

where the terms of the earnest money contract and the deed vary in a manner adverse to the purchaser.70

In upholding the jury's findings, the court decided that Bolton expressly
warranted delivery of his mineral ownership to Alvarado by failing to reserve the mineral interests within the earnest money contract. 7 ' The majorthe court's holding in Weitzel v. Barnes to allow admission of parol evidence only in those
circumstances where it would not vary or contradict the terms of a written agreement. Id.
65. See id. Justice Wallace maintained that because no warranty existed in the deed,
Alvarado brought the suit under the DTPA to create the warranty which was allegedly
breached. Id.
66. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 47 (Tex. 1988). The doctrine of merger is
unavailable in a DTPA breach of warranty suit. Id. A DTPA cause of action arises upon
"breach of an express or implied warranty." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2)
(Vernon 1987); see also Ralston Oil and Gas Co. v. Gensco, Inc., 706 F.2d 685, 692 (5th Cir.
1983)(DTPA provides cause of action for failure to comply with warranties); Melody Home
Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. 1987)(DTPA violation for breach of implied
warranty actionable); La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 564
(Tex. 1984)(injuries from breach of express or implied warranties provide consumers with
cause of action).
67. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988)(DTPA does not codify
common-law rules, requirements or defenses); Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex.
1980)(DTPA not common-law codification and section 17.46 suits do not include common-law
proof requirements or common-law defenses).
68. See Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 (parol evidence rule does not bar admission of oral
representations in DTPA suit); see also Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d at 616 (section 17.46 suits are
unburdened by common-law defenses); Joseph v. PPG Indus., Inc., 674 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(common-law defenses cannot defeat DTPA claims).
69. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988). The Alvarado court held that
the earnest money contract alone can be used to establish express warranties even though the
warranty contradicts the language of the deed previously delivered and accepted. Id. at 47-48.
70, See id. Even though the deed and earnest money contract contradicted each other,
the majority allowed the earnest money contract alone to establish an express warranty to
deliver the mineral rights for which the seller upon non-delivery was held strictly liable under
the DTPA. Id.
71. See id. (jury found Bolton expressly warranted delivery of mineral rights in earnest
money contract).
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ity was correct in ascertaining the existence of an express warranty within
the earnest money contract because Bolton's omission of a mineral reservation created an agreement with Alvarado that delivery of the mineral ownership would follow in the deed.7 2
The majority supported its admission of the earnest money contract into
evidence based upon the holding in Weitzel which allowed the introduction
of parol evidence in a suit under the DTPA. 7' By analogy, Alvarado alleged
fraud and mutual mistake which under the court's prior precedent allowed
admission of the contract into evidence to establish the existence of the alleged warranty. 7' The dissent, however, correctly noted that the decision in

La Sara Grain Co. v. FirstNationalBank of Mercedes75 requires Alvarado to
establish the existence of that warranty independent of the DTPA's provisions before it could be enforced under the DTPA.76
In La Sara Grain, the court established the rule that because warranties
are not contained within the DTPA, warranties enforceable under its provisions must be created independently of the DTPA.77 However, the court
cannot accomplish a proper analysis of the existence or scope of a warranty
without first considering the parties' subsequent agreement(s) to limit, mod-

72. See id. at 47 (fact of Bolton's failure to reserve minerals in contract created agreement
to deliver minerals); see also La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d
558, 565 (Tex. 1984)(parties' agreement under contract will impose express warranty); McCrea
v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(seller's promise or affirmation of fact regarding sale creates express
warranty of performance). See generally S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 970 (3d ed. 1964)(providing definition of express warranty).
73. See Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985). In Weitzel, the court stated
that "oral representations are not only admissible but can serve as the basis of a DTPA action." Id.
74. See Bolton v. Alvarado, 714 S.W,2d 119, 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1986)(Alvarado alleged fraud and mutual mistake by trial amendment), rev'd, 749 S.W.2d 47
(Tex. 1988); see also Davis v. Davis, 175 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex. 1943)(allegations of fraud and
mistake allow introduction of extrinsic evidence); Grohn v. Marquardt, 657 S.W.2d 851, 856
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(allegation of fraud provides exception to
prohibition against introduction of parol evidence); Anderson v. Havings, 595 S.W.2d 147, 153
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ dism'd)(pleading fraud allows introduction of parol
evidence).
75. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984).
76. See id. at 565 (DTPA does not define or create warranties); see also Cheney v. Parks,
605 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(implied
warranties not created by DTPA).
77. See La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at 565. In La Sara Grain, the court stated that any
warranty upon which a DTPA action is predicated "must be established independently of the
Act." Id.; see also Cheney, 605 S.W.2d at 642 (DTPA enforcement requires independent creation of warranties); Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144, 145-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1979, no writ)(under DTPA, only independently created warranties enforceable upon
plaintiff's proof of existence and breach).
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ify, or even exclude the warranty.7 8 Furthermore, while the court's holding
in Baldwin and Weitzel limit the use of common-law doctrines to defend
DTPA suits, neither case limits the La Sara Grain holding involving the
establishment of express warranties nor abolishes any common-law doctrines
governing the creation or elimination of warranties which are enforceable
under the DTPA.7 9 La Sara Grain outlines the various sources of warranties created independent of the DTPA which are enforceable under the
DTPA; however, it does not indicate that establishment of enforceable war-

ranties requires selective use of common-law rules to only create and not

extinguish an enforceable common-law warranty.8' Therefore, when determining the existence of a warranty which is enforceable under the DTPA,

the courts must consider all relevant agreements between the parties" and
78. See Singleton v. LaCoure, 712 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(proper disclaimer of implied warranty prevents enforcement under
DTPA); see also McCrea v. Cubilla Condominium Corp., N.V., 685 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(specific exclusion of express or implied warranties in contract constitutes waiver of DTPA breach of warranty suit unless against public
policy or statute); Rinehart v. Sonitrol of Dallas, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(contractual limitations of liability are effective in DTPA breach
of warranty suit).
79. See Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600 (discussing admission of oral representations). In
Weitzel, the court allowed admission of oral representations to establish a DTPA cause of
action. Id. The court held that the common-law parol evidence rule could not bar establishment of a DTPA claim. Id. The court did not hold that the parol evidence rule was abolished
entirely, but that it could not be used to defend a DTPA claim. Id.; see also Baldwin, 611
S.W.2d at 616. In Baldwin, the court established that the DTPA was not a common-law
codification. Id. Also, the court noted that the DTPA was established to provide consumers
redress for injuries resulting from deceptive acts without the arduous proof requirements and
defenses of the common law. Id. The court, however, did not limit the case of La Sara Grain
or abolish or limit any common-law doctrines which would create warranties and provide a
DTPA cause of action. Id. For example, the court's holding does not state or imply that
courts hearing DTPA warranty actions should not consider all applicable common-law doctrines under which a warranty may be created or extinguished before enforcing the warranty.
See id. Furthermore, a logical argument can be made that the court in Baldwin intended to
limit the prohibition of common-law defenses in DTPA suits to only section 17.46 actions. See
id.
80. See La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex.
1984). In La Sara Grain, the court stated that "the DTPA does not define the term warranty."
Id. Because the DTPA does not establish any warranties, their enforcement requires independent creation. Id. The court also noted that an agreement by the parties to some aspect
of the contract creates an express warranty. Id. In other words, the court in La Sara Grain
recognized that express warranties are dependent upon an agreement between the parties for
their creation based upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. Furthermore, the court
did not limit creation of express warranties to a single agreement simply because the agreement
is in the singular, but identified the requirement that all agreements between the parties under
the facts and circumstances provide the basis for identifying the existence and scope of any
express warranties. See id.
81. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 47-48 (Tex. 1988). The agreement of the
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apply all applicable common-law doctrines which may create or extinguish
that warranty including but not limited to the merger doctrine.8 2 Based
upon the court's prior precedent, the dissent correctly concluded that any
warranty created in the contract was extinguished by delivery and acceptance of the deed because the deed is an agreement between the parties and
the merger doctrine extinguishes any warranties contained in the earnest
money contract by merger.8 3
At the trial court level, Alvarado attempted to establish the existence of
the warranty by pleading that fraud and mutual mistake occurred which
allowed introduction of the earnest money contract into evidence.84 If Alvarado had proven fraud or mutual mistake, he would have established the
existence of the express warranty within the earnest money contract.8 5
However, the jury's answers concerning the special issues failed to find fraud
or mutual mistake as required to allow the earnest money contract to establish an express warranty which is not contained in the deed. 6 Therefore, the
majority should have applied the merger doctrine to the transaction and
looked solely to the deed for the existence of any warranty to deliver the
mineral rights.8 7 By failing to apply the merger doctrine in the absence of a

parties to deliver Bolton's mineral ownership was initially represented by the earnest money
contract. Id. Alvarado and Bolton changed their agreement when the deed was accepted as
performance of the contract which reserved Bolton's mineral ownership. Id.
82. See id. at 48-50 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The dissent properly included an appraisal
of all applicable common-law doctrines including the doctrine of merger, DTPA causes of
action, the parol evidence rule, and the rules governing creation of warranties as established in
La Sara Grain. Id.
83. See Union Producing Co. v. Sanborn, 194 F. Supp. 121, 126 (E.D. Tex. 1961)(all
prior agreements merge into deed); Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 48-49 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
The dissent applied the doctrine of merger to the contract and deed, and concluded that any
warranty which the contract contained was extinguished upon Alvarado's acceptance of "the
deed as performance of the earnest money contract." Id. The contract and deed merged upon
the deed's delivery and acceptance, and the deed did not contain any warranty for delivery of
the mineral rights. Id.; see also La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at 565 (express warranty created
by parties' agreement); Baker v. Baker, 207 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1947, no writ)(contract merges into deed upon acceptance and delivery).
84. Bolton v. Alvarado, 714 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986),
rev'd, 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
85. See Davis v. Davis, 175 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex. 1943)(extrinsic evidence will be admitted if fraud, accident or mistake alleged); see also Grohn v. Marquardt, 657 S.W.2d 851, 856
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(fraud provides exception to parol evidence
rule).
86. Bolton, 714 S.W.2d at 123.
87. See Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985)(proof of fraud
required to avoid merger doctrine); see also Union Producing Co. v. Sanborn, 194 F. Supp.
121, 126 (E.D. Tex. 196 l)(absent fraud or mistake, merger of contract and deed occurs making
deed dispositive of parties' rights); Baker v. Baker, 207 S.W.2d 244, 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1947, no writ)(fraud or mistake required to avoid merger of contract and deed and

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol20/iss3/8

16

Jones: Merger Doctrine No Defense to Deceptive Trade Practices Suit for

1989]

CASENOTE

finding of fraud or mutual mistake, the majority ignored Texas' commonlaw precedent and selectively allowed the contract to establish the warranty,
thereby penalizing Bolton for the breach of a fictitious warranty."8
Applying the doctrine of merger, the dissent correctly concluded that Bolton's delivery and Alvarado's acceptance of the deed extinguished any warranty that existed under the contract. 9 Therefore, the deed was
conclusively binding upon both parties as to the mineral ownership reservation.' The dissent's correct analysis would have required the court to
render a judgment that Alvarado take nothing. 9'
Because the Alvarado court selectively chose to ignore the merger doctrine
by classifying it as a defense to Alvarado's DTPA breach of warranty claim,
it enforced a fictitious express warranty by prohibiting the application of the
doctrine, thereby causing injury to an innocent seller. The injury was precipitated by the court's failure to follow its decision in La Sara Grain Co. v.
First National Bank of Mercedes, which states that express warranties enforceable under the DTPA are determined by considering the agreement of
the parties. As such, La Sara Grain required the court to consider the deed
between Bolton and Alvarado because it represented the parties' agreement
to exclude the previously made express warranty in the earnest money contract from the deed. The proper analysis would require the court to apply
the merger doctrine, whereby the contract and deed merged to formulate the
basis of the parties' agreement in the deed which excluded the express warranty to delivery the mineral rights. Thereafter, the deed which reserved
Bolton's mineral ownership governed the parties' rights and precluded enforcement of any warranty contained within the earnest money contract requiring delivery of Bolton's mineral ownership to Alvarado. The court's
failure to follow its own precedent when determining the existence of an
express warranty enforceable under the DTPA caused unnecessary injury to
an innocent seller. However, punishment of an innocent seller is minor compared to the Pandora's box which the court opened because, under Alvarado
preclude deed from governing parties' rights); Wells v. Burroughs, 65 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1933, no writ)(failure to establish fraud or mistake requires application
of merger doctrine).
88. See Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988). In Alvarado, the court held
that the doctrine of merger was not applicable to a DTPA suit. Id.; see also Bolton, 714
S.W.2d at 123. Because the jury failed to find fraud or mutual mistake, the merger doctrine
was applicable to the contract and deed. Id.
89. See Alvarado, 749 S.W.2d at 48-49 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (merger of contract and
deed extinguished warranty).
90. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex. 1982)(purchaser bound by deed reservations); see also Greene v. White, 153 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Tex.
1941)(purchaser's acceptance of deed binds him to all reservations therein).
91. See Bolton v. Alvarado, 714 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1986)(take nothing judgment against Alvarado), rev'd, 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
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v. Bolton, the deed is no longer dispositive of the parties' rights or titles with
respect to property in Texas. Hereafter, rights and titles to property will be
subject to whichever common-law doctrine the court selectively chooses to
apply in DTPA suits involving express warranties contained in the earnest
money contract but not the deed.
Robert Carl Jones
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